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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1975 TERM
more definitive standards concerning pen registers. Since certiorari
has been granted in In re Pen Register, the Supreme Court now has
the opportunity to resolve the uncertainty which pervades this area.
Hopefully, the Court will set forth specific guidelines for the use of
pen registers analagous to those existing for other forms of electronic
surveillance in Title III. It is even conceivable that the Court will
reinterpret Title I[ to include these investigatory devices. Either
approach would comport with the congressional policy relating to
electronic surveillance, for it would provide a uniform framework for
the courts while protecting against indiscriminate invasions of pri-
vacy by effectively subjecting pen registers to the stringent require-
ments of Title III.
Paul S. Pearlman
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MANDATORY NOTICE PROVISION OF TITLE III
DOES NOT WARRANT SUPPRESSION
United States v. Principie
With the enactment of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,1 Congress established federal proce-
dures for the procurement of a court order authorizing the use of
electronic surveillance and eavesdropping by law enforcement offi-
cials. 2 In an attempt to balance the utility of electronic surveillance
as a law enforcement tool with the fourth amendment's protection
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 See id. §§ 2516-2518 (1970), which outlines procedures for obtaining court authorization
of interception and requirements for the disclosure and use of the information obtained.
Evidence procured through electronic surveillance is admissible in a federal proceeding only
if it has been obtained pursuant to Title III. Id. § 2517(3), (5). Moreover, failure to conform
to these statutory provisions may result in criminal, id. § 2511(1), or civil sanctions, id. §
2520. The civil penalties may include actual or liquidated damages, punitive damages, rea-
sonable attorney's fees, and costs.
Each state is permitted to enact its own electronic surveillance statute, which can be
more, but not less restrictive than the federal legislation. Id. § 2516(2). To date 23 states
and the District of Columbia have done so. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-187 to -189,
54-41a to -41s (1975); D.C. CODE §§ 23-541 to.-560 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to
-26 (West 1971 & Supp. 1976) (effective until July 1, 1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 700.10-
.70 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1976). Many of the largest states, such as California, Pennsyl-
vania, and Texas, have not adopted wiretap legislation. California does not even permit evi-
dence lawfully seized by federal officers under a federal warrant authorizing the wiretap to
be used in state prosecutions. See People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749
(Ct. App.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 414 U.S. 804 (1973).
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from "unreasonable searches and seizures,"' 3 the legislation care-
fully follows guidelines delineated by the Supreme Court the year
before its enactment.4 Pursuant to these directives, Title Il pro-
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV guarantees that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
While the fourth amendment protects an individual's right to the privacy of his oral and wire
communications from governmental intrusion, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-55
(1967), this constitutional protection "need not interfere with legitimate law enforcement."
Id. at 363 (White, J., concurring). Title I attempts to balance these countervailing interests
by providing "every possible constitutional safeguard . .. while, at the same time,
[permitting] law-enforcement officers [to] use electronic surveillance techniques to effec-
tively combat organized crime." 114 CONG. REc. 14,469 (1968) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
The legislation was drafted specifically in response to two Supreme Court decisions,
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2153; 114 CONG. REc. 14,469 (1968) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). In Katz, the Court ruled
that even a reasonable and restrained surveillance without prior judicial approval is unconsti-
tutional. 389 U.S. at 356-59. The Berger Court, in the course of holding unconstitutional a
New York wiretap statute as violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, outlined the
constitutional essentials of a valid electronic surveillance statute. 388 U.S. at 54-60. Title
III carefully incorporates these requirements. Compare Berger v. New York, 388 U.S 41, 54
(1967) (necessity of neutral and detached authority interposed between public and police),
with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1970) (application for electronic surveillance must be made to
judge of competent jurisdiction); compare 388 U.S. at 55 (fourth amendment requires show-
ing of probable cause that a crime has been or is being commited), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)
(1970) (adopting probable cause requirement); compare 388 U.S. at 55-56 (warrant must
particularize specific crime being investigated, place where surveillance is to occur, and
person whose conversations are to be monitored), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970) (adopting
these requirements); compare 388 U.S. at 59-60 (surveillance must be limited in time; war-
rant must have termination date; showing of probable cause required before warrant re-
newed), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), (6) (1970) (length of surveillance limited to time necessary
to achieve its objective but not longer than 30 days; length of renewal orders similarly limi-
ted; renewal issued only upon a showing of probable cause and report on the progress of the
investigation); compare 388 U.S. at 59 (scope of interception limited to conversations con-
nected with the criminal activity being investigated), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970) (inter-
ception required to be "conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communi-
cations not otherwise subject to interception. ... ); compare 388 U.S. at 60 (wiretap stat-
ute must provide for notice), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970) (persons named in warrant
must be notified within a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after termination of
surveillance; those unidentified receive notice at judge's discretion).
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of Title Ill, every
circuit court faced with this question has declared that the statute meets the guidelines
established in Berger, and is therefore constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello,
480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Cafero, 473
F.2d 489, 501 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d
1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d
679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972). While the courts have upheld Title
III, many commentators have expressed doubts as to its constitutionality. See, e.g., Schwartz,
The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order, " 67 MICH.
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vides for particularization of the identity of the person whose con-
versations are to be intercepted,5 minimization of the scope of the
interception,' and notice of the surveillance to persons whose con-
L. REV. 455, 461-66 (1969) (statute permits excessively long and overly general surveillance);
Note, Eavesdropping Provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968:
How Do They Stand in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 89 (1968)
(suggesting §§ 2517(5) and 2518(7) unconstitutional). In contrast, the NATIONAL COMM'N FOR
THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE, REPORT (1976), concluded that electronic surveillance under Title I is an effective
tool in law enforcement and is a sound compromise between individual rights and investiga-
tive efficiency. Id. at 3. A substantial minority of the Commission, however, disputed this
finding, concluding that experience has shown that electronic surveillance is of dubious value
as an aid to law enforcement and often results in "substantial invasions of individual pri-
vacy." Id. For a general discussion of Title I, see Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil-
lance-Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERs L. REV. 319 (1968).
5 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1970) provides that an application for electronic surveil-
lance must specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose
communications are to be intercepted." This language has proven problematic since the
statute does not define when a person is "known." The Supreme Court sought to clarify this
standard in United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974), stating that a person is "known"
within the parameters of Title I, and therefore must be identified in the warrant, only when
the police have probable cause to believe that he is engaged in the criminal activity under
investigation. Id. at 155. It logically follows that where an individual is not suspected of hav-
ing committed the offense for which the wiretap is sought, he fits into the class of "un-
knowns" and evidence may be used against him although he has not been named in the court
order which authorized the interception. See id. The circuit courts have viewed Kahn as re-
solving the identification problem. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 527 F.2d 1051, 1056
(10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Chianzier, 525 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1001-02 & n.13 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 45
U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977). The Supreme Court in United States v. Donovan, 97 S.
Ct. 658, 666 n.11 (1977), explained that Kahn only referred "to known users of the target
telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at the
time of the application." The Court then pronounced the broader rule concerning identifica-
tion: All those whose conversations are "expected" to be intercepted over the target telephone
need to be identified if there is probable cause to believe that they are involved in the
investigated criminal activity. Id. at 668. This determination rejected the government's con-
tention that it need only name one party, the principal target, in the wiretap application,
and still be able to utilize all the intercepted communications against any of the participants.
Id. at 666.
1 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970). The purpose of a minimization requirement is to reduce
the interception of unrelated conversations by limiting the scope of the warrant to those
communications which are relevant and not privileged. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 168, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2229-30. For a study of minimi-
zation, see Note, Minimization and the Fourth Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861 (1974). See also
Comment, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps: Minimization, Amendment,
Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 92, 94-126 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Post-
Authorization Problems].
Unlimited electronic surveillance is an unconsitutional invasion of privacy. See Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). Accordingly, Title I provides the remedy of suppression
for a defendant whose privileged or irrelevant conversations have been intercepted. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(10)(a)(iii) (1970). Suppression is also available to implement the mandate of § 2515,
which prohibits the introduction of wiretap evidence if it has been intercepted in violation of
Title H procedure. Id. §§ 2515, 2518 (10)(a). See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 106,
19771
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versations were intercepted.7 Despite congressional emphasis on
strict compliance, 8 the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Principie,9 recently upheld the admission of evidence obtained
through electronic surveillance even though the government failed
to literally comply with all three of these requirements. Specifically,
the court held that the partial identification of a defendant in the
court order authorizing the wiretap does not warrant suppression in
the absence of bad faith on the part of the investigators.' 0 In addi-
tion, while affirming the suppression of evidence which was inter-
cepted in violation of the warrant's specific minimization provision,
the Second Circuit ruled that where such a violation is not also a
violation of the minimization provision of Title III, it does not re-
quire suppression of other evidence lawfully obtained pursuant to
the same warrant." The Principie court also held that where a
defendant fails to receive statutorily required post-termination no-
tice, the evidence procured through electronic surveillance is never-
theless admissible absent a showing of prejudice.'"
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2195.
Although suppression is clearly applicable where efforts at minimization have failed the
statute does not dictate the degree of suppression which should result. The federal courts,
in the absence of congressional intent, have attempted to resolve this dilemma using a variety
of approaches. See note 39 infra.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d) (1970). Title III provides that two classes of persons are entitled
to notice. The statute mandates that notice be served upon those named in the authorizing
court order within 90 days of the termination of the wiretap. Id. Those who are not identified
in the warrant, but who are participants in the intercepted conversations and subsequently
identified, are entitled to notice only at the discretion of the issuing judge. Id. In Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967), the Court indicated that notice is a constitutional require-
ment of a valid wiretap statute. More recently, in United States v. Donovan, 97 S. Ct. 658
(1977), where the Court was confronted with defendants who failed to receive discretionary
notice, the Supreme Court stated that although notice is "undoubtably important" the war-
rant would not be rendered unlawful if all other statutory requirements were satisfied. Id. at
671. In order to aid the judge in exercising his discretion as to whom among those unidentified
parties is entitled to notice, the Donovan Court ruled that the prosecution has an obligation
to supply the judge with information which classifies the participants in the monitored
conversations. Id. at 669-70, citing United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 540 (9th Cir. 1974).
Donovan is discussed at notes 49-52 and accompanying text infra. For an analysis of problems
dealing with the notice provisions of Title III, see Post-Authorization Problems, supra note
6, at 141-54.
1 Congress intended that Title I prohibit the introduction of all evidence procured
through electronic surveillance unless the communications were intercepted in strict accord-
ance with the statute's provisions. See 114 CONG. REc. 14,469 (1968) (Remarks of Sen. McClel-
lan); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 96, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2185.
531 F.2d 1132, 1134 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977).
'0 531 F.2d at 1138.
Id. at 1140-41.
,2 Id. at 1141-42.
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The electronic surveillance in Principie was instituted at the
request of the New York County District Attorney, who had been
notified by an informant that one Joseph Martino, using the code
name "Paul," had offered for sale stolen United States postal bonds
and various industrial bonds. 13 A New York supreme court order
was obtained on July 5, 1972 which permitted the interception of
telephone calls that were made or received at a certain nightclub
and which involved Martino, a person identified only as "Ralph,"
and any other coconspirators or associates." Surveillance began on
July 11th. By July 14th, the police had learned that they were
intercepting the communications of Paul Labriola, a frequent pa-
tron of the club who had a history involving stolen checks. Although
the police knew Labriola was not Joseph "Paul" Martino, they con-
tinued recording his conversations.15 It was not until July 27th, how-
ever, when the District Attorney applied for a renewal and expan-
sion of the wiretap order, that a warrant included Labriola. The
renewed warrant also authorized "bugging" of the nightclub, specif-
ically limiting it to the hours before 7:30 P.M. 6 This condition,
however, was ignored by the police, who recorded conversations
until midnight or later.17 The electronic surveillance of the nightclub
was voluntarily ended on September 1, 1972.'1
On September 27th a second order, authorizing electronic sur-
veillance at a new location, was the first to fully name Ralph Princi-
pie, although the police had known at least since mid-August that
he was the "Ralph" whose communications were being inter-
cepted. 9 Dawn Slomka, a "relatively minor participant" in the
criminal activity, was never identified in any of the court orders."0
In November 1973, Labriola, Principie, and Slomka were indicted
for conspiracy to forge and utter United States savings bonds stolen
from the mails. While Labriola received post-termination notice on
December 13, 1972, within ninety days of the expiration of the final
11 Id. at 1135.
" Id. at 1135 & n.3. The order, pursuant to the New York wiretapping statute and Title
I, instructed the officers not to record any personal or privileged conversations. Id. at 1135
& n.5. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 700.30(7) (McKinney 1971), is almost identical to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(5) (1970), which requires that all orders and extensions contain limitations designed
to reduce the interception of unrelated communications.
"1 531 F.2d at 1135.
"6 Id. at 1135, 1139. The reason for the 7:30 P.M. time limitation was never explained to
the Second Circuit. Id. at 1135 n.6.
" Id. at 1135-36.
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court order, Slomka and Principie never received official notifica-
tion of the electronic surveillance.21
At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the three defendants "moved
to suppress the fruits of the electronic surveillance as illegally ob-
tained. 2 2 This motion was substantially denied by District Court
Judge Constantino after a lengthy evidentiary hearing, although
those conversations intercepted in violation of the July 27th order's
specific minimization provision were suppressed. 23 The defendants
were subsequently convicted at a brief nonjury trial,24 where much
of the evidence was the product of this challenged eavesdropping.2
In affirming the convictions, the Second Circuit was faced with
a multitude of arguments advanced by each defendant, either indi-
vidually, based on his own unique situation, or jointly. Principie
and Labriola contended that they were not properly identified in the
court orders authorizing the wiretaps since Title III requires that a
court order authorizing electronic surveillance specify "the identity
of the person, if known, whose communications are to be inter-
cepted." 8 Principie argued that he was "known" within the mean-
ing of the statute by August 17th, but was not fully identified in the
orders until September 27th. The Second Circuit noted that Princi-
pie, although identified only as "Ralph" in the initial order, was
thereby at least partially identified from the beginning. He was,
moreover, fully named in more than one application. 27 The court
concluded that the statutory identification requirement was
"sufficiently complied with," and that in the absence of a showing
of bad faith on the part of the investigators," the evidence accumu-
21 Id. at 1136. The September 27th warrant was renewed on October 28th and expired
on November 26th. Id.
22 Id.
21 Id. at 1139.
2, Id. at 1134. Labriola, Principie, and Slomka were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§
371, 495, 1708 (1970). Labriola was also convicted of forging United States savings bonds, a
violation of id. § 495.
531 F.2d at 1136.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a) (1970). The New York statute, N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW §
700.30(2) (McKinney 1971) contains a virtually identical provision.
531 F.2d at 1138. In responding to Principie's contentions Judge Feinberg noted that
the Second Circuit was bound by the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Kahn, 415
U.S. 143 (1974), wherein the Court defined who is "known" within the meaning of § 2518(4).
531 F.2d at 1137. See note 5 supra for a discussion of the applicability of Kahn.
2 531 F.2d at 1138. Accord, United States v. Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir.), afl'd
per curiam, 518 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3584 (U.S. Mar.
1, 1977) (employing a prejudice and bad faith test). But see United States v. Donovan, 513
F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977) (suppression mandated because "known"
participant is a material violation rendering wiretap invalid under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i)
[Vol. 51:375
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lated pursuant to both orders was admissible.29 As Judge Feinberg
stated for a unanimous panel:30 "[W]e fail to see how we can find
(1970)); United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (suppression mandated be-
cause identification is central requirement of D.C. wiretap statute); United States v. Bern-
stein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S. Mar. 1,
1977) (regardless of prejudice, failure to identify defendant where probable cause exists man-
dates suppression). The Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits had held that
suppression was mandated in their attempt to implement the Supreme Court holdings in
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), and United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974). In these decisions the Supreme Court distinguished between noncompliance with a
central provision which is a necessary safeguard in the statutory scheme of Title Im, where
suppression should result (Giordano), and a facially defective warrant, where suppression will
not result if the statutory standard was in fact followed (Chavez). Compare 416 U.S. at 520,
with 416 U.S. at 574-78.
The wiretap application which was at issue in Giordano was not authorized by the
Attorney General or his specially designated assistant as was required by 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)
(1970). The Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that id. § 2518(10)(a) was
intended to exclude evidence only when there has been a violation of a statutory provision of
constitutional proportions. 416 U.S. at 525-29. The Court reasoned that the section mandates
suppression whenever there is a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that
directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investi-
gative device." Id. at 527. For discussion of Giordano, see Note, The Statutory Requirements
for Wiretap Applications Made Clear - United States v. Giordano, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 227
(1974).
In Chavez, an assistant attorney general specifically designated to approve wiretap
applications was incorrectly identified as the authorizing official, when the Attorney General
had, in fact, authorized the application. 416 U.S. at 565. The Court found that this facial
defect did not mandate suppression under § 2518(10)(a), since the wiretap had been properly
authorized despite the facial defect. Id. at 565, 571. Furthermore, the Court decided that not
every violation would render the intercept unlawful within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2515
(1970). According to the Chavez Court, suppression is necessary only where a provision which
plays a "substantial role" in the regulatory scheme of Title III is violated. 416 U.S. at 578.
Recently in United States v. Donovan, 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977), the Supreme Court held that
the identification requirement of Title III is not a central provision, id. at 671-73, thus
abrogating the Giordano analysis of the Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits. The
Donovan Court held that the failure to identify some of the participants in a recorded
conversation is a Chavez-type defect, thereby rendering the wiretap lawful and the evidence
procured pursuant thereto admissible. Id. at 672. The Court distinguished Giordano as an
instance where a statutory provision which was "a congressionally imposed limitation on the
use of the intercept procedure" was bypassed. In Donovan, "however, the statutorily imposed
preconditions to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge was simply un-
aware that additional persons might be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations."
Id. The Donovan Court explained that there was no evidence that Congress intended to make
identification a central provision of Title I. The legislative history merely indicated that
Congress enacted the identification provision in order to include what it thought to be a
constitutional requirement. Id. at 673; cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1967)
(statute must require particularization).
11 531 F.2d at 1138. The Second Circuit also reasoned that judicial supervision during
the application process had adequately protected Principie. Judge Feinberg opined that a
judicial determination finding probable cause for the interception of Principie's conversations
was sufficient to protect his fourth amendment guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id.
3 Judges Moore and Oakes joined in the opinion.
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error in admitting into evidence the fruits of a wiretap conducted
under a court order based on a judicial determination that probable
cause existed to monitor the conversations of this very defendant,
merely because his last name was omitted from the order." '3'
Unlike Principie, Labriola was not "known" prior to the issu-
ance of the initial July 5th order. Labriola contended nevertheless
that the evidence seized under this warrant must be suppressed
since he was known by July 14th, and consequently the police were
required by New York law to amend the first order rather than
merely naming him in the July 27th warrant renewing the initial
order. 32 Under Labriola's interpretation of New York law, an
amendment would be required not only when evidence of a crime
not covered by the original warrant is revealed, but also upon the
discovery of. the identity of a new participant. The Second Circuit
declared, however, that neither federal nor New York wiretap legis-
lation mandates an amendment when new participants in the crime
being investigated are discovered.3 3 Furthermore, Judge Feinberg
3' 531 F.2d at 1138.
31 Id. at 1137-38. The Second Circuit was required to examine New York statutory and
decisional law because a failure to comply with a more stringent state statute precludes
admission in a federal prosecution of evidence obtained under an order granted by a state
court judge, as was the case in Principie. United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 598 n.7
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 771-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, 613, 615 (D. Md. 1974). The New
York wiretap statute is indeed more restrictive than Title III. The federal statute only requires
an application to the court to permit the introduction of evidence of offenses not specified in
the order authorizing wiretapping. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970). The New York statute contains
a broader provision which requires an amendment of the original application in order to allow
the admission as evidence, communications "not otherwise sought." N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW
§ 700.65(4) (McKinney 1971). For a discussion of problems relating to application for
amendments, see Post-Authorization Problems, supra note 6, at 126-29.
3 531 F.2d at 1137-38. The Second Circuit based its decision that it was not necessary
under New York law to amend the warrant to include Labriola on a New York Court of
Appeals case, People v. Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134, 286 N.E.2d 706, 335 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). In Gnozzo, the New York Court of Appeals construed N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.65(4) (McKinney 1971), which requires an amendment when a com-
munication is intercepted "which was not otherwise sought," as referring only to a conversa-
tion producing evidence of a new crime not specified in the warrant. 31 N.Y.2d at 143-44,
286 N.E.2d at 710, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 263. Gnozzo, however, apparently only applied to conver-
sations between a named suspect and an unknown outside party involving a crime specified
in the warrant. Id. at 142-43, 286 N.E.2d at 710, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 263. Recently, the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Di Stefano, 38 N.Y.2d 640, 345 N.E.2d 548, 382 N.Y.S.2d
5 (1976), reexamined § 700.65(4) in a context more analogous to the circumstances in
Principie. In Di Stefano, the conversation of a defendant unnamed in the original warrant
was inadvertently intercepted. Id. at 644-45, 345 N.E.2d at 550, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 7. The Court
of Appeals held that such inadvertent interceptions are admissible. Id. at 649, 345 N.E.2d at
553, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 10. Analogizing to search and seizure law, the court reasoned that such
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reasoned, for a court to so require an amendment would be incon-
sistent with Supreme Court authority emphasizing that the govern-
ment need only name a defendant in the application following dis-
covery of his identity and connection with the crime." The Principie
court found that the investigators "fully" complied with Title II by
naming Labriola thirteen days after the discovery of his identity in
the first extension of the original order.15
A second contention, voiced by Labriola and Slomka,36 was
addressed to the statutory requirement that all court orders author-
izing electronic surveillance contain a provision stating that those
conducting the surveillance must "minimize the interception of
conversations not otherwise subject to interception." 7 Pursuant to
this statutory mandate, the July 27th warrant specifically prohib-
ited "bugging" beyond 7:30 P.M. Since the investigators admittedly
ignored this restrictive provision and intercepted conversations
until at least midnight, the defendants argued that all conversations
recorded under color of the warrant should be suppressed." Noting
that the minimization provision of the court order had clearly been
violated, the Second Circuit, in order to determine the appropriate
remedy, first turned to the various approaches taken by those courts
which have had occasion to address their attention to the issue of
minimization. 9 The court found, however, that these prior decisions
a conversation was in "plain view" and therefore could be seized. Id. at 648-49, 345 N.E.2d
at 552-53, 382 N.'iS-.d at 9-10. In dictum, the court stated that once a conversation is
foreseeable, it can ho longer be recorded inadvertently and therefore an amendment becomes
necessary. Id. at 649, 345 N.E.2d at 553, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 10. A retroactive "amendment is
required to insure the continuing good faith compliance with the original warrant and not to
circumscribe the trial use of properly, though accidentally, overhead incriminating conver-
sations." Id. at 650, 345 N.E.2d at 554, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11.
Applying Di Stefano to Labriola, it is submitted that an amendment of the first warrant
was necessary on July 14th when the police discovered that Labriola's conversations were
being monitored although he was not the target of the wiretap.
31 531 F.2d at 1136, citing United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
531 F.2d at 1138. Significantly, the court noted the 13 day lapse of time between
discovery and identification has been held to conform to the New York requirement that an
order be amended upon the discovery of a new crime "as soon as practicable." Id., citing
People v. Sher, 68 Misc. 2d 917, 329 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Greene County Ct. 1972) (application to
amend within 13 days reasonable).
' 531 F.2d at 1139.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
' 531 F.2d at 1139-41.
:9 Id. Minimization poses a great problem for courts because Title HI does not define this
rather nebulous term. It has been noted that the very choice of the word "minimize" is
indicative of congressional recognition that some innocent, extraneous, or privileged commu-
nications would of necessity be intercepted during the course of surveillance. See United
States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1046 (D. Md.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United
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were inapplicable to the unique situation in Principie, which in-
volved a violation of the warrant's specific minimization provision
rather than a violation of the statutorily mandated minimization
provision. Judge Feinberg stated that the court was "less inclined
to use the drastic remedy of suppressing conversations that were
themselves seized legally" where the violation in question, even
though admittedly blatant, involved a limited minimization provi-
sion, the purpose of which was never explained to the court, and not
"the usual minimization provision which embodies a statutory re-
quirement central to the policy of Title III." ' The Principie court
consequently chose to suppress only those conversations intercepted
States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). The expectation
that some conversations outside the scope of the warrant would be monitored, in conjunction
with the absence of any statutory directive, makes it exceedingly difficult for courts to deter-
mine what constitutes compliance with the minimization mandate of Title I. This problem
is exacerbated by the pragmatic difficulties inherent in the conduct of a wiretap. As a practi-
cal matter, minimization is problematic since conversations which begin as innocent or social
calls may eventually turn to discussions of a criminal offense; criminal activity may be spoken
of in slang or code, so as to appear innocent; and, in an investigation of a large conspiracy,
some participants may appear uninvolved at first. See United States v. La Gorga, 336 F.
Supp. 190, 196 (W.D. Pa. 1971). As an aid in determining whether investigators have made
a good faith effort at minimizing the interception of extraneous conversations, many courts
employ a statistical test and have looked to the percentage of the recorded telephone calls
that are irrelevant. It is thought that such an analysis will reveal whether there has been
compliance with Title I. See United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 273-76 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 541-43 (S.D. Cal.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
But see United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (monitoring 100% of
calls not per se failure to minimize). If there has been a blatant disregard of the statute's
requirement of minimization, total suppression will result. United States v. Curreri, 363 F.
Supp. 430, 437 (D. Md. 1973). On the other hand, where attempts at minimization have
merely been inadequate, courts reason that total suppression is too harsh a result, and instead
selectively suppress their conversations which are innocent or privileged and should not have
been monitored at all. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp: 735, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y.'1973),
aff'd on other grounds, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974). Courts
favor selective suppression because it is the traditional approach utilized in search and
seizure law. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974). It has been suggested, however, that the practice of selective suppression is
equivalent to judicial approval of an invasion of privacy. United States v. Focarile, 340 F.
Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469
F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). The Focarile court declared that minimi-
zation, being prophylactic in nature, should be performed by the investigators while monitor-
ing and not by the courts "after the interception is a fait accompli." 340 F. Supp. at 1046,
1047. Furthermore, the threat that all intercepted conversations will be suppressed may have
a deterrent effect, forcing investigators to minimize surveillance during the investigation. Id.
For a discussion of the dilemma posed by minimization, see Note, Minimization: In Search
of Standards, 8 SuFFoLK L. REv. 60 (1973).
10 531 F.2d at 1141.
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in violation of the order's time limitation.4
In addition to the allegations addressed to identification and
" Id. at 1140-41. It is submitted, however, that the blatant failure of the police in
Principie to-abide by the warrant's specific provision is analogous to those situations where
the officers flagrantly disregarded the statute's minimization provision. In such cases, all
evidence is suppressed. See note 39 supra. This approach demands that all communications
intercepted under the July 27th warrant be suppressed. The fact that Principie involved a
failure to obey the warrant's time limitation rather than a violation of the statute itself
should not necessarily result in the conclusion that total suppression is foreclosed, for Title
III provides the remedy of suppression where the interception is not executed in "accordance
with the court order," as well as for violations of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970).
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972), determined
that eavesdropping must be conducted in conformity with any limitations set forth in the
authorizing order as well as with the provisions of Title I. Id. at 774-75. The authorizing
order in George provided that a telephone conversation could be intercepted only if either of
two named parties was on the premises and the voice on the telephone could be recognized
as one of the two parties identified in the warrant. Id. at 774. The police were not given a
copy of the warrant and were unaware of the restriction and hence did not abide by it. Id.
Although the limitation in the George warrant affected all of the conversations intercepted
whereas the Principie court was confronted with a time limitation which enabled the conver-
sations intercepted in violation of the provision to be severable from those validly recorded,
the Sixth Circuit's analysis is nonetheless persuasive. The George court examined Title III
and found that 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10)(a)(iii) (1970) provides for suppression where the inter-
ception violates the terms of the authorizing order. The Sixth Circuit also based its holding
on United States v. Desist, 394 U.S. 244 (1968), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated its
decision in United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and declared that electronic surveil-
lance can be conducted only under judicial supervision and with "precise limitations and
appropriate safeguards." 465 F.2d 772, 774-75, quoting United States v. Desist, 394 U.S. 244,
246 (1968). Although the Desist Court affirmed the defendants' convictions because it decided
to apply the Katz rule prospectively, the George panel relied on the Supreme Court's dicta
in Desist indicating that limitations in the warrant must be obeyed. Fearing that electronic
surveillance would become an "indiscriminate dragnet," the Sixth Circuit concluded that for
wiretapping to exist within the cautious limitations of Title II, all evidence must be sup-
pressed where the officers have not complied with the authorizing order. 465 F.2d at 775.
Surveillance regulated entirely by the discretion of the very police who have ignored the
warrant's limitations is an unconstitutional search and seizure because judicial supervision
thereby becomes a charade. Such an interception is in the nature of a general search which
is abhorrent to the fourth amendment, see, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390
(1914), and cannot be cured by selective suppression.
Accordingly, it would seem that the Second Circuit should have suppressed all evidence
intercepted under color of the July 27th warrant because the officers, in executing the court
order, transformed the limited surveillance into a general search. Total suppression is man-
dated as a deterrent to overly zealous police officers who fail to observe the prescribed
prophylactic limitations. See note 39 supra. Though barred from the remedy of total suppres-
sion by the Second Circuit, the Principie defendants are otherwise adequately compensated
by Title III for any damage sustained at the hands of the law enforcement officials. Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970), they are entitled to civil redress for this illegal interception of their
communications. See note 2 supra. Although good faith reliance on a court order is a complete
defense to an action brought under this section, such a defense would undoubtedly fail in
Principie, because the police blatantly ignored the time limitation provisions of the warrant.
For a discussion of the civil remedy provided by Title II, see Post-Authorization Problems,
supra note 6, at 125-26.
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minimization, Principie contended that the notice requirements
prescribed by statute had not been complied with, and thus com-
plete suppression of all wiretapping evidence was warranted.2 Sec-
tion 2518(8)(d) of Title III requires that while those not identified
in the court order authorizing the eavesdropping need receive notice
only at the judge's discretion, those identified must receive notice
within a reasonable time which in no event may be later than ninety
days after the termination of the surveillance.4 3 Principie argued
that since he did not even learn of the surveillance until his indict-
ment, nearly a full year after the termination of the wiretapping, he
clearly did not receive the statutorily mandated notice. Accord-
ingly, he contended that the wiretap evidence against him was inad-
missible in light of United States v. Giordano," wherein the Su-
preme Court held that a violation of a central provision of Title Im
necessitates suppression." The Second Circuit, however, requiring
a demonstration that a defendant be prejudiced by the lack of no-
tice, held that since Principie had failed to sustain his burden of
proving prejudice, his suppression motion was properly rejected.46 In
so holding, the court relied on its prior decision in United States v.
Rizzo,4" despite the possibility that Giordano may have undercut
Rizzo's precedential value.48
42 531 F.2d at 1141.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
4 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
4 Id. at 528.
531 F.2d at 1141.
47 492 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 944 (1974) (notice one month late
but five months prior to suppression hearing upheld). Accord, United States v. Manfredi, 488
F.2d 588, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974). In Manfredi, wherein a six-
month delay in serving notice was upheld, Judge Oakes described the holding as stretching
"the interpretation of the statutory provisions to [its] constitutional limits .... " He
added, however, that "none of the appellants have made or attempted to make any showing
of prejudice .... " 488 F.2d at 602.
The Principie court also noted that other circuits employ a prejudice test for failure to
comply with Title I's notice requirement. 531 F.2d at 1141, citing United States v. Bohn,
508 F.2d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975) (suppression ndt mandated
absent clear showing of prejudice); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 500 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974) (reasonableness test used to determine whether delays in
service demand suppression); United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1973)
(prejudice test).
41 531 F.2d at 1141. See note 28 supra. The Second Circuit also ruled that the failure to
notify Slomka did not warrant suppression. Since Slomka was never identified in any of the
warrants, she was entitled to notice only at the judge's discretion, unlike Principie to whom
post-termination notice was mandatory. 531 F.2d at 1143. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
Finding no abuse of discretion in the decision not to give notice to Slomka, especially in light
of her relatively minor participation in the conspiracy, the Principie court affirmed the
rejection of her notice contentions. 531 F.2d at 1143.
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Some support for the Second Circuit's decision in Principie
may be gleaned from the subsequent holding of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Donovan.4" The Donovan Court held that the
failure to serve a defendant with discretionary notice does not
trigger the remedy of suppression available under section
2518(10)(a)()10 where the conversations have been lawfully inter-
cepted.5! The Court noted that since there was no indication of
congressional intent that the discretionary notice provision play a
central role in the statutory scheme, the Giordano rule was not
applicable.5 2 It must be emphasized, however, that Donovan dealt
The Principie court was also presented with a notice issue by Labriola. Although Labriola
did receive notice, he contended that such notice was untimely because while it did occur
within 90 days of the expiration of the final order, it was given more than 90 days after the
voluntary termination of the surveillance at the first location. While the district court had
accepted Labriola's argument that the applicable time period should be measured from the
termination of the initial warrant, it found that, like Principie, he had not been prejudiced
by the untimely notice. The Second Circuit ruled, however, that the 90-day period should be
measured from the expiration of the last authorizing order, rather than from the date the
police had stopped intercepting conversations at the first location. Id. at 1142. In determining
that notice is not due until the expiration of the last order or the termination of all surveil-
lance, the Second Circuit referred to the express language of Title 11I which calculates the
90-day period as beginning after the expiration of the "order or any extensions thereof." 18
U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970). Consequently, the court held that the notice to Labriola was
timely, thus making an inquiry into prejudice unnecessary. The Principie court reasoned that
any other conclusion would subvert the statutory intent to postpone notice until after the
investigation has been terminated. 531 F.2d at 1142. It is submitted, however, that the Second
Circuit has erroneously interpreted congressional intent. The Senate Report, indicating that
notice is due 90 days after the surveillance is terminated, gives an example of a situation
virtually identical to that in Principie. The Report suggests that the 90-day period be mea-
sured from the termination of surveillance provided that the notice due at the end of the
surveillance at the first location is postponed. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 105,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2194. Moreover, since Title III allows
postponement of notice upon a showing of good cause, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970), the
notice due at the termination of surveillance at the first location could have been postponed
upon application to the court.
4' 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i) (1970). Section 2518(10)(a) provides that the defendant can
move to suppress conversations which were intercepted unlawfully when the authorizing court
order is "insufficient on it face," or the electronic surveillance was not conducted in conform-
ity with the authorizing order. Id.
11 97 S. Ct. at 673-74. The Supreme Court explained: "Nothing in the structure of the
Act or the legislative history suggests that incriminating conversations are 'unlawfully inter-
cepted' whenever parties to those conversations do not receive discretionary . . . notice
." Id.
12 Id. at 673. The Donovan Court reasoned that although the notice provision was
"undoubtably important," id. at 671, it was not central because "postintercept notice was
[not] intended to serve as an independent restraint or resort to the wiretap procedure." Id.
at 674. The Court employed the Giordano-Chavez analysis, see note 28 supra, and concluded
that the failure to serve discretionary notice was more analogous to a Chavez defect because
the intercept was lawful and therefore suppression could not result. 97 S. Ct. at 673-74.
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specifically with the discretionary notice requirement of Title III,
and thus does not mandate the Principie result. It is suggested that
mandatory notice is clearly distinguishable from discretionary, and
that the suppression remedy provided by section 2518(10)(a)(i) is
applicable in the Principie situation. 3
The Supreme Court has ruled that notice is an essential ele-
ment of a valid wiretap statute in that it is necessary to retain judi-
cial control and supervision over electronic surveillance.54 To meet
this standard, the Title III notice provision unequivocally deline-
ates the requisite procedures. If, however, the government can fail
to serve mandatory notice as required by Title III and still be
permitted to utilize the fruits of the wiretap, then the notice provi-
sion becomes a hollow requirement and judicial supervision be-
comes a charade.15 Although the Donovan Court could find no legis-
lative intent that discretionary notice be a central provision, there
is ample evidence that Congress intended mandatory notice to be
such a functional safeguard. 6 Moreover, the deterrent effect of the
threat of suppression ensures that the government will follow consti-
tutionally mandated procedures. It is submitted, therefore, that
Prior to Donovan, the circuit courts had concluded that because notice is a constitutional
requirement of a valid wiretap statute, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967), the notice
provision of Title III is a functional safeguard within the statutory scheme and therefore
suppression will result if there has been a failure to comply. See, e.g., United States v.
Donovan, 513 F.2d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977); United States v.
Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1004 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S.
Mar. 1, 1977); United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1974). Interestingly, these
circuit court cases all deal with discretionary notice.
The Supreme Court seemingly recognized the distinction between mandatory and
discretionary notice. The Donovan Court stated: "An inventory notice must be served within
the designated period of time upon 'the persons named in the order or application.'" 97 S.
Ct. at 664 n.6 (emphasis in original), citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
51 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). The Donovan Court ruled that the
Title III provision fulfills the constitutional requirements. 97 S. Ct. at 669 n.19.
11 Justice Marshall, dissenting in Donovan, declared that the majority's "conclusion that
the notice provision is not central dismantles this carefully designed congressional structure."
Id. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' See 114 CONG. REC. 14,479-80 (1968), where Senator McClellan stated: "The issuing
judge must provide the persons named in the order [with notice]." There is further evidence
that Congress intended mandatory notice to play a central role in Title In. The legislative
history of the statute indicates that originally there was no provision for discretionary notice.
The amended version of the Senate bill, however, provided for both mandatory and discre-
tionary notice. Id. at 11,485-86. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970). Furthermore, Title III
provides for postponement of notice upon an application to the issuing judge, id., and Senator
McClellan stated during the debates that postponement could only be granted upon a show-
ing of exigency. 114 CONG. REc. 14,479-80 (1968). It is submitted therefore, that mandatory
notice, as envisioned by Congress, is essential to the framework of Title MI, and that suppres-
sion should be available for the failure to comply literally with this provision.
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suppression pursuant to section 2518(10)(a)(i) should be available
where the government has failed to conform with the mandatory
notice provision of Title Im.
Suppression is the remedy which best serves to retain the deli-
cate balance between the constitutional guarantee of the privacy of
one's oral and wire communications and the utility of electronic
surveillance as a law enforcement tool. Title III attempts to balance
these conflicting interests by prohibiting wiretapping unless it is
conducted in conformity with the statute and the authorizing war-
rant, and by providing the remedy of suppression when these condi-
tions are not satisfied. The Second Circuit in Principie has upset
this balance in favor of the prosecution. The unfortunate effect of
the decision will be to encourage overly zealous law enforcement
officials to conduct surveillance without strictly complying with the
procedures delineated by the statute.
Erica B. Garay
